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Abstract
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   Water and sanitation utilities in Africa operate in a 
high-cost environment. They also have a mandate to 
at least partially recover their costs of operations and 
maintenance (O&M). As a result, water tariffs are higher 
than in other regions of the world. 
   The increasing block tariff (IBT) is the most common 
tariff structure in Africa. Most African utilities are able to 
achieve O&M cost recovery at the highest block tariffs, 
but not at the first-block tariffs, which are designed to 
provide affordable water to low-volume consumers, who 
are often poor. At the same time, few utilities can recover 
even a small part of their capital costs, even in the highest 
tariff blocks.
   Unfortunately, the equity objectives of the IBT 
structure are not met in many countries. The subsidy 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Development Division, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort in the department 
to improve the global knowledge base on African infrastructure as part of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at sgbanerjee@worldbank.org.  
to the lowest tariff-block does not benefit the poor 
exclusively, and the minimum consumption charge is 
often burdensome for the poorest customers. Many 
poor households cannot even afford a connection to the 
piped water network. This can be a significant barrier to 
expansion for utilities. Therefore, many countries have 
begun to subsidize household connections.
   For many households, standposts managed by 
utilities, donors, or private operators have emerged as an 
alternative to piped water. Those managed by utilities 
or that supply utility water are expected to use the 
formal utility tariffs, which are kept low to make water 
affordable for low-income households. The price for 
water that is resold through informal channels, however, 
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1  The conflicting goals of tariff design 
Water systems in developing countries must (1) provide services that are safe, desirable, and 
affordable to consumers; and (2) ensure an institutional and commercial system capable of actually 
recovering costs (Stalker and Komives, 2001). These often conflicting goals have significant political and 
economic implications. The effort to balance them is particularly challenging in developing countries and 
can lead to the implementation of price structures that do not help meet either goal and, in fact, have an 
adverse impact on poor consumers (Whittington, Boland, and Foster, 2002).  
Like any business, utilities must recover their costs if they are to sustain their operations. Tariffs are 
the most common way of doing so. But tariffs serve other goals beyond raising revenues to cover all or 
part of costs. They also are used to ensure access across socioeconomic groups, to send price signals to 
users about the relationship between water use and water scarcity, and to ensure fairness in water service 
delivery (Cardone and Fonseca, 2003).  
In developing countries, tariffs are controversial for many reasons. For policy makers, one objective 
can be more important than another, which can lead to the adoption of different tariff structures. The 
impact of such structures on consumers is ambiguous. Despite recent advances,
1 policy makers are not 
sufficiently informed of the effects on consumer behavior. A lack of competition in the water market 
implies that policy makers do not have a market test of whether a tariff structure is functioning 
effectively, with consumers unable to reject a tariff structure that is negatively impacting them 
(Whittington, Boland, and Foster, 2002).  
In most developing countries, prices are usually set below full cost recovery for historical and 
political reasons, and there are implicit and explicit subsidies associated with the tariff structure. That is 
the conventional wisdom, but there has been insufficient focus on Africa to evaluate whether its water 
tariffs are meeting the desired goals. This paper looks at water and sanitation
2 tariffs in Africa, along with 
their relationship to cost recovery, cross-subsidies, and financial sustainability. Water tariff structures are 
measured against the criteria of cost recovery, efficiency, and equity. Questions include: do tariffs recover 
costs? are customers metered? are there cross subsidies between large and small consumers, public 
standposts, and private residential consumers? are water usage charges equitable, and are water 
connection charges fair?  
The data presented in this paper represent tariffs for 45 water utilities from 23 countries in Africa, 
collected during 2006–07. Four of those countries (Cape Verde, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa) are 
considered middle-income countries (MICs); the rest are low-income countries (LICs). The tariffs are 
those that are currently enforced by the utilities (those approved but not yet enforced are not included), 
from which detailed descriptions of technical, financial, and governance performance were elicited. These 
data were collected in the context of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) study,
3 which 
                                                 
1 For instance, the poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) has been undertaken in many developing countries to 
understand the ex ante and ex post impact of tariff changes on consumer behavior.  
2 For utilities that provide wastewater services. 
3 For more information on AICD, please go to the project website, www.infrastructureafrica.org. COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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constitutes a major knowledge base designed to achieve a substantial improvement of data on 
infrastructure sectors in Africa. The AICD Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) Survey Database, which 
includes indicators on institutional structure, sector performance, and tariff structures, is referred to 
throughout the text. 
Utilities covered are (1) national in the countries where there is a single utility, and (2) regional or 
provincial where there are many service providers in a decentralized system. In the case of the latter, we 
tried to include only the three largest utilities in a given country. Except in Nigeria, which has 36 state 
utilities, the database represents either all or a major share of the urban service areas in the countries 
represented. Nine countries have a single supplier, and only four countries—Cape Verde, Chad, 
Madagascar, and Rwanda—have the same service provider for both water and electricity. All but six of 
the utilities in the database belong to countries that have experienced recent reforms in the sector. 
Interestingly, though private investment in WSS has been relatively limited in Africa, 30 utilities in the 
sample have experienced private sector participation in the past 15 years (annex A).  
2  An overview of WSS tariffs in Africa 
Water service costs include (1) an initial infrastructure and connection cost and (2) operations and 
maintenance (O&M) and rehabilitation costs. The first is considered fixed, and the second variable. 
Rehabilitation can be considered as the “enhanced maintenance” of assets that need to be replaced on a 
periodic basis in a well-functioning system (Kingdom and others, 2004). Production and O&M costs are 
typically recovered from water tariffs that, theoretically, can have either one part or two parts. One-part 
tariffs have either a fixed charge or a water-use charge, which may be uniformly volumetric, a block tariff 
(increasing or decreasing), or an increasing linear tariff. The two-part tariff generally comprises both a 
fixed charge and a water-use charge (Whittington and others, 2002). The consumer has no control over 
the fixed charges, which can be exogenously determined by pipe size, location, number of rooms, and so 
on. The volumetric tariff, which is based on water use, usually takes the form of an increasing block tariff 
(IBT). Linear tariffs and flat charges are rarely used.  
The structure of metered water tariffs  
The IBT has long been a common structure in developing countries. Under it, unit prices in the lower 
brackets of consumption (expressed in cubic meters per month) tend to be lower than the prices in higher 
brackets. In theory, the IBT allows utilities to meet the goals of efficiency and equity. Lower-
consumption bands are priced at a low level (sometime even at 0), or subsidized heavily to allow low-
volume consumers to take advantage of infrastructure services. It is believed that the poor who are 
connected to the network have lower levels of consumption, and that by reducing prices for the lower 
brackets of consumption, the service is made more affordable to the poor. At the other end, high-volume 
consumers pay a higher price, which is expected to be closer to the long-term marginal cost (Olivier, 
2006).  
Many countries in Africa have adopted a two-part tariff structure, which incorporates both a fixed and 
a water-use charge. Two-part tariffs aim to recover both production and administrative costs (such as COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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billing and meter reading) from the fixed part of the tariff, while the water-use part covers partial O&M 
costs. The fixed-cost element of the two-part tariff allows the recovery of investment costs without 
distorting price signals. Two-part tariffs are designed to simultaneously meet economic efficiency and 
cost-recovery goals (Whittington, Boland, and Foster, 2002).  
About 14 utilities have designed a two-part tariff, including 13 that enforce a “fixed charge + IBT”; 
only NWSC in Uganda imposes a “fixed charge + linear tariff” structure. (The names of the surveyed 
utilities are spelled out in the list of acronyms and abbreviations on page v.) In addition to these utilities, 
seven utilities have a “minimum consumption + IBT” structure. Among the remaining 24 utilities, there is 
an interesting variety. Nineteen impose an IBT structure. Three enforce a linear structure, which means 
that households pay the same price per unit of consumption. These are FCT WB in Nigeria, and the NWC 
in South Darfur and the Upper Nile in Sudan. Two other utilities have a different tariff structure. The 
CRWB in Malawi charges a flat fee or fixed charge for the first 32 units of consumption, and the 
KIWASCO in Kenya has a U-shaped structure in which tariffs decline after the first block and rise again 
after the third (figure 1B and annex B).  
The block structure can add to the complexity of tariffs. It can range from one block (linear) to seven, 
with the average being just above three blocks. Only four utilities have a single-block (or linear) tariff. At 
the other extreme, Drakenstein in South Africa has seven. Electrogaz in Rwanda, and Johannesburg and 
Tygerburg in South Africa, have a six-block water tariff structure. The MIC average is just above four 
blocks, while the LIC average is just under three. The most common is a three-tiered block structure; 16 
utilities fall into this category. This is followed by a four-block structure; 10 water utilities in Africa 
exercise this tariff structure (figure 1A).  
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Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007.  
 
Fixed charges can take two forms: a minimum consumption charge, and a monthly fixed fee. The 
monthly fixed fee is evident in about 13 of the sampled water utilities in Africa. This fee is usually based 
on pipe size (which varies). The lower end of the range, corresponding to the usual residential pipe size of 
15–20 millimeters (mm), is considered. In countries such as Benin, Cape Verde, Chad, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, and Senegal, none of the COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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utilities impose fixed charges on the water bill. The other mode of fixed fee is a monthly minimum charge 
for a fixed amount of consumption. This charge is levied to cover the fixed part of the O&M cost. Seven 
utilities have this charge; in all cases, the charge includes consumption of, at most, 10 cubic meters (m
3). 
SODESI in Cote d’Ivoire and BWB in Malawi levy a minimum consumption charge for less than 10 m
3, 
with the lowest volume of 5 m
3 enforced in BWB. In the five utilities in Mozambique, the minimum 
consumption is 10 m
3, regardless of actual consumption. 
The size of the first block can vary. In most countries, it is usually below 10 m
3; only nine utilities 
have designed a first block that is higher than 10 m
3. Only 16 utilities have a first block that is less than 6 
m
3/month, considered almost subsistence consumption. At the other extreme are utilities with a large 
consumption spread in the first block. In Kaduna and Katsina, for instance, the first block captures 
consumption of up to 30 m
3. Similar are the GWCL, NWC Khartoum, SDE in Senegal, and MWSA in 
Tanzania, where the first block is more than 20 m
3. The size of the last block also reveals interesting 
patterns. The last block can start from 5 m
3, for instance in the SONEB in Benin or the DAWASCO in 
Tanzania. It can also start at 1,000 m
3, as it does in Drakenstein, South Africa, or Katsina, Nigeria. 
Interestingly, the tariff structure in Drakenstein has seven blocks, and Katsina has only three blocks. In 29 
or 64 percent of the utilities, the starting point of the last block is less than or equal to 50 m
3 (table 1, 
annexes C and D).  
































SONEB  IBT  89.1 0 n 2 5  5+  0.41  0.85 
ONEA  IBT  98.2 0 y 3 6  30+  0.39  2.13 
ELECTRA  IBT  91.2 0 y 5 7  20+  0.00  1.20 
STEE  IBT  — 0 n 3 8  300+  2.67  4.67 
REGIDESO  IBT  28.2 0 n 4  10  40+  0.05  0.12 
SODESI  IBT  100.0 9 n 3 7  20+  0.19  0.42 
AWSA  IBT  — 0 n 4 5  30+  0.26  0.44 
ADAMA  IBT  90.1 0 n 4 5  50+  0.14  0.34 
Dire  Dawa  IBT  — 0 n 2  20  20+  0.52  0.73 
GWCL    IBT  — 0 n 4  10  60+  0.18  0.52 
NWASCO  IBT  — 0 n 5  10  60+  0.60  0.60 
KIWASCO  U-shape  58.2 0 y 4 5  24+  0.29  1.18 
WASA  IBT  98.2 0 y 2  10  10+  0.03  0.08 
Beira  IBT  99.9  10 y 3 9  30+  0.00  0.66 
Maputo  IBT  98.2  10 y 3 9  30+  0.00  0.71 
Nampula  IBT  100.0  10 y 3 9  30+  0.00  0.58 
Pemba  IBT  99.1  10 y 3 9  30+  0.00  0.57 
Quelimane  IBT  100.0  10 y 3 9  30+  0.00  0.57 
JIRAMA  IBT  97.1 0 y 1  10  30+  0.30  0.61 
LWB    IBT  98.1 0 y 3 4  40+  0.00  0.52 
BWB    IBT  22.6 5 n 0 0 0  0.00  0.00 
CRWB    Flat  — 0 n 4  15  85+  0.71  3.48 


































Windhoek  IBT  — 0 y 4 6  40+  1.01  1.94 
Oshakati  IBT  96.5 0 y 3  10  40+  0.26  0.92 
SEEN  IBT  96.8 0 n 1 0 0  0.39  0.39 
FCT  WB    Linear  23.6 0 n 2  30  30+  0.16  0.19 
Kaduna  WB    IBT  16.1 0 n 3  30  1000+  0.19  0.28 
Katsina  WB    IBT  6.5 0 n 6 5  500+  0.44  1.09 
Electrogaz  IBT  98.7 0 n 4  20  60+  0.37  0.73 
NWC  Khartoum  IBT  — 0 n 1 0 0  0.64  0.64 
NWC  South  Darfur  Linear  — 0 n 1 0 0  0.59  0.59 
NWC  Upper  Nile Linear  0.0 0 n 3  20  40+  0.37  1.46 
SDE    IBT  117.3 0 n 2  15  15+  0.22  0.47 
DAWASCO    IBT  70.5 0 n 2 5  5+  0.39  0.52 
DUWASA  IBT  27.9 10  y  3 14  25+  0.00  0.51 
MWSA    IBT  100.0 0 y 3  24  75+  0.24  0.28 
NWSC  Linear  94.5 0 y 1 0 0  0.65  0.65 
Drakenstein  IBT  60.7 0 y 7 6  1000+  0.00  1.86 
Tygerberg  IBT  60.3 0 y 6 6  50+  0.00  1.86 
eThekwini  IBT  66.4 0 y 3 6  30+  0.00  1.77 
Johannesburg  IBT  52.4 0 n 6 6  40+  0.00  1.40 
SWSC    IBT  — 6 n 4  10  50+  0.30  0.47 
LWSC    IBT  33.3 0 y 5 6  170+  0.25  0.55 
NWSC    IBT  — 0 n 4 6  50+  0.25  0.37 
MIC average  78.2     4.4    0.23  1.50 
LIC average  66.4     2.9    0.34  0.80 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
Note: MIC = middle-income countries; LIC = low-income countries. 
— = data not available. 
 
Developing countries have often used the price of a first block as a social tariff or lifeline, so that the 
poor can have access to at least a minimum quantity of safe water at a subsidized price. Most of the policy 
debates over the impact of tariffs on equity revolve around this issue and whether it is actually serving the 
poor. The average price of the first block in African water utilities is about $0.32/m
3. About 20 utilities 
charge less than $0.20/m
3 for the first block. South Africa is unique in that it has a free water policy, with 
the first 6 m
3 delivered at no charge. This gives small consumers the opportunity to meet their minimum 
consumption needs for free. (It is also the reason why the average first-block tariff shown in table 1 is 
lower in the MICs than in the LICs.)  
ELECTRA in Cape Verde is an outlier, with the first-block tariff amounting to $2.7/m
3, followed by 
Oshakati in Namibia, which has a first-block tariff of just above $1/m
3. In a number of countries with a 
minimum consumption charge—such as Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi (BWB), and Mozambique—the block 
structure begins with block two, and the price of block one is therefore zero.  
The price of the last block in an IBT structure is often set with an eye on cost recovery and water 
conservation. In about one-third of utilities, the tariffs are set higher than $0.8/m
3: of these, 13 have last-COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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block prices of more than $1. ELECTRA, ONEA, Walvis Bay, and Windhoek have adopted a last-block 
tariff of more than $2/m
3. The fixed charges, which are expected to be paid every month irrespective of 
consumption, are usually set at less than $4. Of the 20 utilities that enforce a fixed-fee or minimum-
consumption charge, about half are set between $2 and $4. Only eThekwini in South Africa charges a 
fixed fee of more than $4.  
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Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
Structure of unmetered water tariffs 
In Africa, water metering is surprisingly widespread, with many utilities reporting 100 percent 
metering in their service areas. Nine utilities have implemented operating meters for all residential and 
nonresidential connections. For 35 utilities for which detailed information is available, the average 
metering ratio is 75 percent. Other utilities, including those in Nigeria and Sudan, have almost negligible 
or no metering. Most others fall somewhere in between. Those households without meters, however, can 
escape water utilities’ enforcement mechanism, resulting in revenue losses. To capture the cost of 






The average industrial 
price for the first block is 
$4.5/m
3; the commercial price 
is about $3.7/m
3; and the 
government and institutional 
price is about $3.9/m
3, with a 
median commercial tariff of 
around $0.75/m
3. These prices 
are driven by utilities that charge exorbitant tariffs, such as those in Mozambique, Oshakati, and Dodoma. 
In Mozambique, for instance, minimum consumption of up to 25 m
3 is enforced, at a price of about $16. 
The effective cost is reduced to about $4/m
3 only when nonresidential consumers use about 100 m
3, an 
average consumption level for industrial and commercial customers. About 17 utilities enforce a linear 
commercial tariff, and the rest have adopted an IBT structure. About 21 utilities levy the same charge on 
industrial, commercial, and government consumers (annex E). 
Structure of wastewater tariffs 
The majority of Africans use on-site sanitation to meet their basic needs, as sewerage facilities are 
very limited. The responsibility of providing sewerage services may rest with water utilities or the 
government. Only in Senegal does a separate sanitation utility (ONAS) provide these facilities to the 
population. Of the 45 utilities in the sample, 18 do not have any wastewater responsibility. The structure 
of payment for sanitation varies; it can either be part of the water bill, calculated as a percentage, or it can 
be a block or fixed-tariff structure. In the case of eight utilities, the sanitation charge is levied as part of 
the water bill, which can range from 30 percent in Zambia to 85 percent in Lesotho, with an average of 53 
percent. Oshakati enforces a fixed charge, and Walvis Bay levies both a fixed charge and a block tariff 
structure (figure 3 and annex E).  















Wastewater tariff part of water bill
Fixed fee
Block tariff
Fixed fee + Block tariff
 
 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
Table 2. Structure of unmetered tariffs 





GWCL   Ghana  Fixed charge  3.11  235.29 
FCT WB   Nigeria  Fixed charge  3.14  15.68 
Kaduna WB  Nigeria  Fixed charge  10.59  55.41 
Katsina WB   Nigeria  Fixed charge  5.45  n.a. 
SWSC Zambia  Fixed  charge  12.16  50.00 
LWSC Zambia  Fixed  charge  7.84  n.a. 
NWSC Zambia  Fixed  charge  6.53  235.29 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 




The block tariff structure for sewerage is evident in six utilities in Africa, and the number of blocks 
can vary between one and five. ONEA in Burkina Faso and AWSA in Ethiopia maintain only one tariff 
block (a linear tariff), and households pay the same effective price irrespective of consumption. At the 
other extreme is KIWASCO in Kenya, which enforces a five-block tariff structure. Walvis Bay in 
Namibia has a block tariff in which prices decline with rising blocks. A specific connection fee for 
sewerage is found in eight utilities. In other cases, it may be implicitly accounted for by the water-
connection fee for utilities that have a wastewater responsibility. Among the utilities that have a block 
tariff structure, only KIWASCO in Kenya levies a connection fee of $90 (table 3 and annex F).  
Table 3. Structure and level of wastewater tariffs  









ONEA BFA Flat  n.a  0  1  0+  n.a. 0.04  0.04 
AWSA   ETH  Flat  n.a  0  1  7.1+  n.a.  0.07  0.07 
NWASCO   KEN  IBT  n.a  0  4  0–10  60+  0.13  0.21 
KIWASCO KEN  IBT  $90  0  5  0–10  60+  0.21  0.42 
Walvis Bay  NAM  DBT  n.a  $2.69  4  0–15  85+  0.34  0.02 
ONAS SEN IBT  n.a  0  3  0–20  40+ 0.02  0.13 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
n.a. = not applicable. 
Cost of water and overall economic development 
Water costs appear to be positively correlated with countries’ overall level of economic development 
(figure 4). The coefficient of the relationship is estimated to be 0.42. Cost per cubic meter at an average 
consumption of 10 m
3 increases as the country’s gross national income (GNI) per capita increases, which 
is expressed by an upward slope. The countries in the sample include the LICs and countries—such as 
South Africa, Cape Verde, Lesotho, and Namibia—that have a GNI per capita of more than or close to 
$1,000. These extreme cases may disproportionately push up the slope. For instance, GNI per capita in 
South Africa is much higher than in other countries—for example, it is more than 40 times that of the 
DRC, the lowest-income country in the group. But even if the utilities in South Africa, Cape Verde, and 
Namibia are excluded from this group, the relationship would still remain positive, though the slope 
would decline. COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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Figure 4. Cost of water and GNI per capita 
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Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007; World Development Indicators (WDI), 2007. 
3  Do tariffs recover costs?  
Cost-recovery policies in African utilities 
New demographic trends have made the challenge of meeting service-delivery objectives acutely felt 
in Africa; consequently, the drive toward cost recovery is even more urgent. Population numbers in the 
service areas of utilities and operators are continuously increasing, often in periurban areas because of 
rising trends in urbanization. To service previously unserved areas and to maintain existing connections 
on a sustainable basis requires investment in new networks and the maintenance of existing systems at 
least partially funded by the internally generated revenues of service providers. From the supply side, 
service providers need to recover costs by imposing and collecting consumer tariffs in order to be 
financially sustainable. Enforcing cost-recovery tariffs enables utilities to leverage resources from other 
sources—donors and, particularly, the private sector. From the demand side, the ability of consumers to 
pay tariffs influences the capacity of utilities to be financially capable of expanding access and ensuring 
service quality.  
Recovering the cost of providing service, at least for O&M, is a stated objective of water utilities 
around the world. The majority of African countries also report that their water tariffs are set with the 
goal of cost recovery. Only Chad reports that tariffs are set without a specified cost-recovery mandate. 
Benin also states that there is no specified tariff policy, although in practice the utilities aim to recover 
O&M costs, plus some investment costs. Including Benin, 19 countries are expected to fully recover 
O&M costs as well as some amount of investment costs through tariffs. Two countries (Sudan and 
Ghana) indicated that there was no requirement to recover investment costs, only O&M. In the case of 
urban wastewater, no country requires covering any part of the investment cost. For the 10 utilities for COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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which information is available, seven expect all O&M to be recouped, and three require only partial 
O&M costs to be met (table 4).  
Table 4. Cost-recovery policy for WSS  
Sector Countries  (%)  Sector  Countries 
(%) 
Urban Water  Urban Wastewater 
Existence of cost-recovery policy 
Cost-recovery policy 
  All O&M and some investment 
  All O&M and no investment 
  Partial O&M and no investment 
Cost shortfall met by 
 Central  government 
 Regional  government 











 4 (1) 
13 (3)  
22 (5) 
Existence of cost-recovery policy 
Cost-recovery policy  
  All O&M and some investment 
  All O&M and no investment 






Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
 
The burden of covering operating shortfalls is shared among government levels and donors, 
sometimes with more than one contributing stakeholder. Twelve countries reported that the central 
government is responsible, while four (Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Sudan) saw a responsibility at the 
regional and local government level. Kenya, Lesotho, and Zambia responded that donors have a shared 
responsibility. Interestingly, only 12 of 24 countries stated that costs and revenues related to the provision 
of water services were ring-fenced. It is not clear whether this is because ring-fencing is not being 
effectively implemented, or whether institutional arrangements make it impossible to isolate and track the 
costs and revenues related to water services. The ring-fencing of costs is even more difficult for 
wastewater—only nine utilities reported that revenues and costs are specifically related to the provision of 
wastewater systems. 
Structure of O&M costs  
To measure whether tariffs reflect market conditions, it is important to understand the nature of 
service-provision costs. While piped-water and wastewater systems bring productivity, health, and 
environmental benefits, these cannot be quantified; this section only focuses on the financial recovery of 
the capital and O&M cost. The tariffs imposed on consumers can be compared against the average cost of 
production to arrive at the exact degree of cost recovery. Therefore, an operational cost-recovery target 
for African utilities should ideally emerge from financial and technical performance data.  
There have been two recent sources of utility performance data in Africa. First, the International 
Benchmarking Initiative (IBNET) collected operational cost data for water and wastewater systems in 
Africa. The unit cost of water sold by African utilities ranges between $0.30/m
3 in 2001 to $1.10/m
3 in 
2005 (IBNET, 2007). The number of utilities reporting this information is, however, different each year, 
and the 2005 cost is representative of only South African utilities. The IBNET data were also used by 
Kingdom and others (2006), who used the cost of 41 Asian, East European, and African utilities to arrive 
at acceptable cost-recovery thresholds. The average O&M cost/m
3 was reported as 0.30/m
3, with the COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
11 
 
estimates for African utilities being $0.34/m
3. Rehabilitation and renewal costs, in addition to the average 
O&M cost, would amount to $0.35/m
3. Second, the AICD WSS Survey Database (2007) collected 
information on operational expenses per unit of water produced and sold for about 53 water utilities in 
Africa. This survey contains information on reported annual O&M costs, and annual production and 
consumption, which is used to arrive at the O&M cost/m
3 from 2002 to 2005. The operational expense 
per unit of water produced and sold is estimated to be $0.41/m
3 and $0.62/m
3 respectively in 2005, and 
has continually increased in nominal terms since 2002. Two-thirds of utilities operate within the operating 
cost band of $0.4/ m3–$0.8/m
3 (annex G).  
Figure 5A. O&M cost/m3, 2002–05  
Nominal US dollars 


















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
O & M Cost/m3 of Production







<0.2 >0.2 & <0.4 >0.4 & <0.6 >0.6 & <0.8 >0.8
 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
 
The average O&M cost/m
3 is driven by the high cost (more than $1) of providing services in MICs, 
including South Africa and Namibia. In fact, in Windhoek, the operating cost of each unit of water is 
more than $2. The average O&M cost/m
3 for utilities in MICs is $1.16/m
3, and in LICs it is $0.48m
3. The 
internationally acceptable threshold of $0.4/ m3 for cost recovery of O&M using Global Water 
Intelligence (GWI) reports is a rather conservative estimate for Africa (Foster and Yepes, 2006). In 
summary, two levels of operating cost-recovery thresholds are used in the rest of this paper: the GWI 
O&M cost threshold of $0.4/m
3, and the AICD actual O&M cost/m
3 for each utility.  
Arriving at capital cost estimates is more complicated. Kingdom and others (2004) estimate that 
capital costs in addition to O&M and rehabilitation costs would be $0.91/m
3. This is based on an average 
consumption of 60 liters per capita/day, an average capital cost of $120 per capita, and a lifetime asset use 
of 20 years. The per capita cost of $12.22 is arrived at using the above assumptions, at an 8 percent 
discount rate. Foster and Yepes (2006) use a similar figure of $0.8/m
3 from GWI as an internationally 
acceptable benchmark for partial capital-cost recovery to evaluate cost recovery in Latin America.  
Meeting the actual O&M cost is achieved in many utilities in Africa. Of the 38 utilities for which 
detailed O&M cost information is available from the AICD WSS Survey Database, about 22 meet the 
cost with an average consumption of 10 m
3. Similarly, a high proportion of African water utilities meet 
their O&M cost at the GWI cost-recovery threshold.4 Out of the 45 African utilities under consideration, 
                                                 
4 The scope of this paper is limited to analyzing the possibility of tariffs to cover costs, and not whether the utilities 
are actually raising the revenues to meet the costs. That is, the collection ratio and enforcement mechanisms are not 
explored in this study.  COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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17 have average tariffs (calculated at 10 m
3) higher than $0.40/m
3, and only four utilities have a tariff 
more than $0.80/m
3, which is high enough to cover O&M and partial capital cost. These four utilities that 
enforce a tariff of more than $1 are in South Africa, Namibia, and Cape Verde—all MICs. Cost recovery 
is much more evident in nonresidential tariffs. About 20 utilities enforce a commercial tariff of more than 
$0.8/m
3 in the first block. About 95 percent of the utilities charge a price of more than the O&M cost-
recovery threshold of $0.4/m
3, at an average commercial consumption level of 100 m
3 (table 5).  
Table 5. GWI cost-recovery thresholds 
Threshold African  utilities 
% of utilities achieving the 
threshold 
(average residential 
consumption = 10 m
3) 
% of utilities achieving the 
threshold 
(average commercial 
consumption = 100 m
3) 
<US$0.20/ m3  Tariff insufficient to cover basic 
operating and maintenance costs 
16 3 
US$0.20–0.40/ m3  Tariff sufficient to cover operating and 
some maintenance costs 
49 3 
US$0.40–1.00/ m3  Tariff sufficient to cover operating, 
maintenance, and most investment 
needs 
27 24 
>US$1.00/ m3  Tariff sufficient to cover operating, 
maintenance, and most investment 
needs in the face of extreme supply 
shortages 
9 71 
Source: GWI, 2004; Foster and Yepes, 2006; Kingdom and others, 2006; AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007.  
 
More utilities are able to cover costs at extremely low or extremely high levels of consumption than at 
average levels. Though the capital cost figures vary based on the assumed consumption levels, it is still 
useful to compare cost recovery across different consumption blocks (figure 6). The degree of cost 
recovery decreases from 58 percent at 4 m
3, to 38 percent at 10 m
3, and rises to 64 percent at 40 m
3. At 
even a higher consumption of 50 m
3 per month, 12 utilities cover O&M and partial capital costs compared 
to 10 utilities at 40 m
3. It is clear that households at the low and high ends of consumption are 
contributing more to cost recovery than the average consumer (annex H).  
Many utilities do not meet their investment cost threshold levels even at the highest block prices. The 
expectation of an IBT is that the prices at higher blocks will reflect the marginal cost of water provision. 
Not surprisingly, the highest block tariff is more successful in meeting the O&M cost than the capital cost 
in many utilities. Only nine utilities are unable to meet O&M expenses, while the same is true for capital 
cost of 30 utilities. All seven utilities represented from South Africa and Namibia realize investment costs 
at the highest block tariff levels; other utilities that achieve this are in Cape Verde, Benin, Niger, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, and Cote d’Ivoire.  
In sum, the experience of recovering WSS operating costs in Africa is positive, with many utilities 
setting tariffs at levels high enough to recoup O&M costs. The performance of African utilities is superior 
to that found elsewhere in the world. For instance, in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), which has 
the best record among developing countries, the degree of partial O&M cost recovery is only 38 percent 
(Foster and Yepes, 2005). In Africa, the tariff structures are designed in a way more conducive to meeting 
O&M costs at the high or low ends of consumption. At the highest block levels, 80 percent of the utilities 
are able to regain operating costs.  COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
13 
 







































3, % of utilities meeting  
  GWI O&M cost ($0.4/m
3) 
  AICD O&M cost (utility specific) 







3, % of utilities meeting  
  GWI O&M cost ($0.4/m
3) 
  AICD O&M cost (utility specific) 





 9 (4) 
At 40m
3, % of utilities meeting  
  GWI O&M cost ($0.4/m
3) 
  AICD O&M cost (utility specific) 






Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
4  Do tariffs provide efficient price signals?  
An efficient tariff structure involves setting prices that signal the marginal benefits of water use to 
consumers. Prices should therefore encompass not only financial costs, but also the externalities that the 
use of water imposes on the economy and environment. A well-designed, efficient tariff guarantees the 
highest aggregate benefits for the marginal cost of supplying water (Whittington, Boland, and Foster, 
2002).  
The efficiency of tariff structures is evident from a number of attributes. First, metering that precisely 
estimates water use encourages frugality. The official estimates of metering are relatively high in African 
utilities, with many reporting more than 90 percent metering in their service areas. But the extent of 
functioning and the evidence of meter tampering are not known. Second, fixed-fee or minimum 
consumption charges are applicable in half the water utilities in Africa, and usually complemented by a 
volumetric charge. This fixed fee can usually vary from $1 to $4 per month irrespective of the volume of 
water used. While the volumetric charge is dependent on water consumption, the fixed fee does not 
provide any incentive to consumers to be frugal in water use. Fixed charges, operated in an era of 
increasing water use—often associated with rising population and incomes—can lead to stagnation of 
revenues, with a consequent impact on efficient utility functioning (Whittington, Boland, and Foster, 
2002). Third, the IBT structures achieve efficiency by meeting the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) at the COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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higher levels of consumption. An IBT structure would closely match the increasing marginal cost curve 
that rises with higher consumption. The price at the highest block is sufficiently high enough to meet the 
capital and O&M cost threshold in about 15 African water utilities. The nonresidential tariffs are usually 
set higher than residential tariffs, and the block structure is designed to recuperate the investment costs at 
least at the highest block. In some countries—particularly, in South Africa, Namibia, and across some 
utilities in Nigeria—the highest tariff block is substantially higher that the investment cost threshold, 
suggesting a negative impact on the cost structure of such commercial and industrial entities. These 
enterprises, in an attempt to control infrastructure input costs, would be better off with self-supply.  
In summary, relatively high levels of metering and tariffs in Africa suggest that consumers are sent 
efficient price signals on water use. On the other hand, the use of fixed costs by some utilities can lead to 
inefficient resource use. But the necessity of water demand management is relatively less important in 
Africa. Most consumers in Africa survive on almost subsistence quantities of water. The situation in 
Africa is exactly opposite to that in South Asia, with its low levels of metering and tariffs, which send 
consumers distorted signals on the value of water.  
5  Are tariffs equitable?  
Threshold consumption levels can be used to compare tariff structures across countries in Africa. Though 
consumption varies across households in different countries, the tariff levels at these approximate 
estimates can be computed to understand how small, medium, and large consumers compare with respect 
to payment for water. The World Health Organization (WHO) has set a per capita consumption of 25 
liters/day as minimum consumption for survival. The average and maximum consumption is derived from 
a recent survey by the Water Utility Partnership (WUP) in 2002. The consumption levels for a family of 
five can range from 4 m
3/month at the subsistence end, to 40 m
3/month at the high end; 10 m
3/month can 
be considered average consumption. These three consumption levels will be used to compare effective 
tariffs and the degree of cross-subsidization among different categories of consumers.  
Table 6. Categories of residential consumers 
Household consumption  Liters/capita/day  Household size  Approx. m
3/month 
Minimum/small 25  5  4 
Average/medium 60  5  10 
Maximum/large 250  5  40 
Source: WHO; SPBnet (WUP), 2002. 
 
The tariff at a consumption of 10 m
3 is about $0.49/m
3 in Sub-Saharan Africa (table 7), and the 
median at this level is $0.38/m
3. ELECTRA in Cape Verde is clearly an outlier, with tariffs amounting to 
above $3 for a consumption level of 10 m
3. This is due to desalination, which raises the production cost of 
water. If Cape Verde is excluded, the average tariff is $0.43/m
3. The tariff levels in Africa are comparable 
to the average in LAC, which at $0.41/m
3 at an average consumption of 15 m
3 is considered higher than 
other regions in the world, such as East Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. South Asian water 
tariffs are the lowest in the world, with an observed average tariff of only $0.09/m
3. The average COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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developing country tariff is less than half the average tariff of countries in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
Table 7. Comparison of water tariffs in Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions ($/m3) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  4 m
3 10  m
3 15  m
3 40  m
3 
Average 0.55  0.49  0.52  0.65 
Median   0.41  0.38  0.40  0.51 
Comparable tariffs (average consumption = 15 m
3) 
OECD     1.04   
Latin America and the Caribbean      0.41   
Middle East and North Africa      0.37   
East Asia and Pacific      0.25   
Europe and Central Asia      0.13   
South Asia      0.09   
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007; Foster and Yepes (2006).  
 
The average price at the minimum consumption of 4m
3 is higher than at 10 or 15m
3, and lower than 
the price at the high-end consumption level of 40 m
3. In fact, excluding ELECTRA, the average prices at 
4 m
3 and 40 m
3 is almost the same (figure 7). At the minimum consumption of 4 m
3, the average tariff 
across the 45 utilities is $0.55/m
3, and $0.50/m
3 excluding ELECTRA. At 4 m
3, two utilities in 
Namibia—Windhoek and Oshakati—have effective prices of more than $1, besides ELECTRA, and six 
utilities have tariffs very close to $1. The number of utilities that enforce an effective tariff of more than 
$0.8/m
3 is highest at the consumption level of 4 m
3. At the average consumption level of 10 m
3, the 
majority of utilities impose a tariff between $0.4 and $0.8/m
3. At the high-end consumption level of 40 
m
3, very few utilities—REGIDESO in DRC, Kaduna WB, Katsina WB, and JIRAMA in Madagascar—
have an effective tariff of less than $0.2/m
3. The majority of utilities charge at least $0.4/m
3 at this level 
of consumption (annex F).  
































<0.2 >0.2 & <0.4  >0.4 & <0.8  >0.8
 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
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Equity in water-connection charges  
The costs of connecting to the network can prove to be a significant barrier to consumers in Africa. In 
the case of 26 utilities for which information on connection charges is available, these charges vary 
widely (figure 8A), from about $6 in the Upper Nile in Sudan to more than $240 in Niger, Mozambique, 
and Cote d’Ivoire. Connection charges are more than $300 in Drakenstein, eThekwani, and Johannesburg 
in South Africa. Even among the water utilities in the same country, connection costs can vary. For 
instance, in AWSA, Adama, and Dire Dawa —three utilities in Ethiopia, connection costs are $14, $9, 
and $43 respectively. A comparison with GNI per capita suggests that, in some countries, the connection 
charge is relatively expensive (figure 8B). On average across Africa, the connection charge is 28 percent 
of GNI per capita. In MICs such as South Africa and Namibia, though the connection cost is high, it is 
negligible compared to GNI per capita. On the other side are countries such as Niger, where the 
connection charge is more than 100 percent of the GNI per capita. Similarly, in the five water utilities in 
Mozambique, connection charges are more than 75 percent of the GNI per capita.  
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Figure 8B. Comparison of connection costs with GNI per capita 
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Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
Cross-subsidies for water and wastewater consumers 
Many African utilities are responsible for providing wastewater services in addition to water supply. 
Wastewater charges are either included in the water bill or imposed separately in the form of a fixed or 
block structure. For the utilities that enforce a block tariff structure, it is possible to compare water and 
wastewater prices at similar levels of consumption. The consumers of wastewater services are subsidized 
by water users (figure 9). In ONEA and ONAS, particularly, the water charges are several orders of 
magnitude higher than the wastewater charges.  
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Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007.  
Cross-subsidies for metered and unmetered consumers 
The high prevalence of metering implies a low incidence of unmetered rates, and is imposed as a 
fixed charge. The downside of the fixed charge is that households consuming a low volume of water end 
up paying a higher price, and consumers of high volumes of water pay a price that does not adequately 
reflect the true cost of the water used. For instance, in Ghana, consumers who survive on the minimum 
subsistence level of 4 m
3/month pay $0.77/m
3, while those at the higher end of 40 m
3/month pay only 
$0.08/m
3 (figure 10). This is also the case with other utilities in Nigeria that levy a fixed charge. 
Comparing metered and unmetered rates at the same levels of consumption suggests that, at the lower 
end, unmetered consumers are paying more. In Kaduna, for instance, the unmetered price at the 
subsistence consumption level of 4 m
3 is 14 times that of the metered rate. At the higher levels, the 
metered consumers pay more. At the high-end consumption level of 40 m
3, unmetered consumers pay 
slightly more than metered consumers only in Kaduna WB and LWSC.  

























































 Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007.  
Cross-subsidies of small and large consumers 
Average tariffs across different consumption levels in African utilities reveal the high price that small 
consumers are paying for water. To test whether small consumers pay lower prices than large consumers, 
we computed the water price per cubic meter at several consumption levels. The effective price sharply COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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declines at the average consumption of 10 m
3, then rises again (figure 11). The price at the survival 
consumption of 4 m
3 is roughly comparable to the price at 20 m
3 of consumption.  
















Average Average w/o ELECTRA Median Median w/o ELECTRA
 
Note: ELECTRA is an outlier with high effective tariffs. 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
 
It is important to further discuss the merits of IBT in fulfilling its premise, as the majority of utilities 
in Africa use this type of tariff structure. First, the implementation of the IBT structure is based on the 
implicit assumption that small consumers are poor and large consumers will cross-subsidize the small 
ones. This assumed relationship between poverty and consumption is very important in evaluating the 
subsidy incidence of the IBT. Second, households in the higher-income bracket usually consume more 
water. Therefore, they are expected to pay more for the additional consumption. Third, a sufficiently high 
price in the last blocks discourages wasteful water use and enables households to conserve water. Fourth, 
charging low tariffs for small consumers brings a larger proportion of the population into the fold of 
network coverage, and therefore creates public health externalities generated by superior quality water 
(Whittington and Boland, 2003).  
The IBT assumptions rest on the fact that all consumers are metered, so it is possible to exactly 
estimate their water consumption and bill them for it (Whittington and Boland, 2003). In Africa, though 
water metering is relatively high, it is still low in a few cities, such as those in Nigeria and DRC. Another 
problem is that housing is shared among many households in Africa, making it difficult to exactly 
estimate how much each household is consuming—though households devise ways of dividing the water 
bill based on household size, number of rooms, and so on. But since so many households are consuming a 
relatively large quantity of water, which falls in a higher block, the bill is consequently higher. The IBT 
structure, therefore, has an unintended consequence for poor households consuming piped water 
(Whittington, 1992). For these reasons, the use of IBT in meeting the goals of efficiency and equity has 
been questioned in recent years. 
The two-part tariff structure, implemented in many utilities in Africa, can fail to favor small 
consumers because of two reasons. First, the fixed-fee and minimum consumption charges place an 
enormous burden on low-volume consumers. This is the part of the water bill they cannot control COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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irrespective of their level of consumption. Komives and others (2005) compare the average price per m
3 
of IBT, IBT with fixed fee, and IBT with fixed fee and minimum consumption charges, and find that low-
volume consumers under the latter two-tariff regimes bear the burden of higher prices. Second, the 
arrangement of the block’s size and price is important, particularly that of the first block. If the first block 
is wide, it not only allows leakage of the implicit subsidy to the nonpoor, but also leads to a higher price 
per m
3 for the low-volume consumers in the band.  
In only a few countries in Africa do small consumers pay the lowest price. Among the 45 utilities in 
the sample, the effective price increases with rising consumption in 27 utilities (table 8). In the majority 
of utilities, high-end consumers pay more than low-end or average consumers. But inequity is more 
prevalent at the lower end of the consumption—among households consuming between 4 and 10 
m
3/month. In almost three-fourths of cases, the consumers with water intake at the survival level pay 
equal or higher than the average consumers.  
The tariff structures in Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi (BWB), and Benin most favor small consumers. In 
SODESI in Cote d’Ivoire, consumers at the survival level pay only $0.04/m
3, which increases to about 
$0.53/m
3 for large-volume consumers with intakes of 40 m
3. In Benin, average consumers pay 1.5 times 
more than small consumers, and large consumers pay more than twice the small consumers. The 
Ethiopian utilities, WASA in Lesotho, ELECTRA in Cape Verde, and DAWASCO in Tanzania also 
strongly favor the small consumer. Mozambique, Malawi (CRWB and LWB), Madagascar, and Tanzania 
(DUWASA) are the countries where the tariff strongly favors large consumers. In Mozambique, small 
consumers must pay 60 percent more than mid-level consumers, and more than 35 percent compared to 
large consumers. In Madagascar, small consumers have to pay 41 percent more than mid-level consumers 
and 30 percent more than large ones. 
In 16 utilities, the effective tariffs of small consumers are higher than those of average consumers. 
This difference is pronounced in the case of five utilities in Mozambique. Since these utilities have a 
minimum threshold of 10 m
3, the small consumer whose water intake is about 4 m
3 pays on average about 
$0.57 more than those consuming 10 m
3 and about $0.40 more than those consuming 40 m
3. Therefore, it 
is not economical for households to consume less than the minimum threshold, as they end up paying 
more for consuming less water (Figure 12). 
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Fixed and minimum consumption charges have a significant impact on the unit price paid by the 
small consumers. With a fixed charge, small consumers usually have to pay a higher price per unit than 
large consumers. This is evident in Mozambique, which imposes a minimum consumption charge up to 
10 m
3, has a regressive tariff structure, and whose effective tariff—at 4 m
3 of consumption—is very close 
to $1. The average price at 4 m
3 for utilities that impose a fixed-fee or minimum consumption charge is 
$0.64/m
3, as opposed to $0.47/m
3 for those that do not. These charges comprise 100 percent of the 
effective price at 10 m
3 in all utilities in Mozambique, Tanzania (DUWASA), and Malawi (CRWB). 
The size of the first block can also impact the price paid by small consumers. Generally speaking, the 
larger the size of the first block in an IBT structure, the higher the probability that subsidies for the low 
price of the first block will leak to large consumers. Out of the 45 utilities in the sample, only nine have a 
tariff design with a first block that rises above 10 m
3 (the rest have a flat or linear structure). For instance, 
in Kaduna and Katsina in Nigeria, households pay $0.16/m
3 and $0.19/m
3 for up to 30 m
3 of 
consumption. This effect, though important, is overwhelmed by the fixed-fee and the minimum 
consumption charges that can erase the positive impact of the block tariff structure on small consumers.  
Cross-subsidies between nonresidential and residential consumers 
Cross-subsidization between 
residential and nonresidential 
consumers has been used to provide 
relief for poor consumers at the 
expense of nonresidential consumers. It 
is expected that these nonresidential 
consumers (which may be industrial, 
commercial, or governmental) should 
pay nearly the full price of water 
provision. In most countries, the utility revenue is primarily generated from industrial and commercial 
customers, though the number of customers is relatively lower than residential consumers. For instance, 
in Uganda, the nondomestic consumers contribute more than 60 percent of the NWSC’s revenues while 
constituting less than 15 percent of the connection base (table 8).  
The effective tariffs of nonresidential 
consumers can be compared with high-
end residential consumption at 100 m
3. 
The nonresidential consumers pay more 
than the residential consumers to all 
utilities except REGIDESO, KIWASCO, 
WASA, LWB, Windhoek, Electrogaz 
Tygerberg, eThekwani, and Johannesburg. 
In Mozambique, the commercial 
consumers pay about seven to eight times 
more than residential consumers for 100 
m
3 of water. The implicit subsidy is most 









(%)   
Public standpipes  3.2  4.7  2.1 
Domestic 82.8  47.9  36.7 
Institution/government   3.4  25.5  29.2 
Industrial/commercial 10.6  21.9  32 
Source: Uganda Ministry of Water and Environment, 2006. 












Between 1 and 2
More than 2
 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007.  COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
22 
 
evident in Oshakati in Namibia, where the commercial consumers pay about 20 times more than the 
residential customers for 100 m
3 of water (figure 13). 
Not only the levels, but the rate of increase in nonresidential tariffs is higher. For instance, in Niger, 
the standpost and low-volume tariffs have barely increased since 2000, but the industrial and commercial 
tariffs have registered a 6–7 percent growth in nominal terms (figure 14). While the Niger case is one of 
differential price increase, the LWB case is of equal price rise. The increase across all tariff bands has 
been equal in LWB in Malawi, though the increase at each level has been different. What emerges from 
this analysis is the discrepancy of prices among residential and nonresidential consumers. Infrastructure 
price inefficiencies create distortions in the development of the dynamic private sector as well.  
Figure 14. Evolution of tariffs in Niger and Malawi 
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Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
Cross-subsidies between public standposts and residential consumers 
Utilities also supply water to standposts in addition to piped connections to houses and yards. In 
recent years, the standposts have emerged as an important source of water supply to households, 
particularly in the periurban areas in Africa. To reach this segment of the population, prices at the 
standposts are usually subsidized so that low-income households can benefit from improved water supply. 
The important policy question is whether the objective of providing affordable water to standpost users is 
realized. Evidence suggests that the retail price charged by standpost or kiosk operators can be several 
orders of magnitude higher than the formal price, defeating the purpose of providing cheap water. This 
price may also be higher than the prices paid by low-volume consumers of piped water. From the AICD 
WSS Survey 2007, it is possible to compare the formal and informal standpost price with the low-volume 
piped consumer price for 12 utilities. This highlights the extent of cross-subsidy that exists between the 
low-volume consumers at standposts and piped connections (figure 15).  COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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< 1 >1 and <2 >2 and <5 >5
 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
Note: The DRC is not included in the graph because the formal standpost price is almost negligible. 
 
 
The average price at standposts is $0.63/m
3. Windhoek and GWCL are the only utilities with a 
standpost charge of more than $1. At the other end are standpost consumers in Kinshasa, Addis Ababa, 
Antananarivo, and Lusaka, who pay less than $0.20/m
3 for water. Comparing the standpost consumers 
with low-volume piped consumers presents interesting results. In about half the utilities, the standpost 
consumers are paying more. For the rest, the evidence suggests that piped consumers are cross-
subsidizing the standpost consumers at the same level of consumption. The consequence would be 
severely inequitable if the standpost and average piped consumers are in similar income strata.  
The formal tariff may not, however, be what consumers really pay. Operators and middleman come 
between the utility and consumers. The result is a highly dynamic market where informal or retail prices 
are much higher than the formal or official standpost tariffs. Except in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, 
where the informal and formal prices are roughly similar, the informal prices are higher by several 
degrees of magnitude compared to the formal price. For half the utilities, the informal standpost price is 
between two and five times the formal standpost price. This is true of dense periurban areas with piped 
water shortage who have a significant dependence on the standposts. For instance, in Kinshasa in DRC, 
the informal standpost price is about $1, while the formal standpost price is almost negligible. Similar is 
the case in Antananarivo, Lusaka, and Cotonou, where the informal prices are more than five times higher 
than formal tariffs. In Accra, for instance, the informal and formal standpost prices are $5 and $3, 
respectively, while low-volume piped consumers pay $0.52/m
3 (annex I).  
A few conclusions on the equity of tariff structures emerge from this analysis. First, the subsidy to the 
low block under the current IBT structure is not exclusively received by small consumers (usually the 
poor); instead, a large amount of the subsidy leaks to large consumers. Second, because of the fixed and 
minimum consumption charges and the large size of the low blocks, small consumers often end up paying 
higher effective prices per unit than large consumers. Third, the connection cost is high for many utilities 
compared to GNI per capita, indicating significant affordability problems for expanding networks into 
unserved areas. Fourth, the retail standpost price is higher than the utility-imposed price, resulting in high 
rent-seeking behavior on the part of operators. Fifth, the nonresidential tariffs are typically higher than COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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household tariffs, suggesting cross-subsidization of residential consumers by high-volume industrial and 
commercial consumers.  
6  A scorecard of tariff performance 
A scorecard compiled on the basis of cost recovery, efficiency, and equity criteria suggests that many 
utilities are able to balance these goals, a majority of the utilities meet one of the conditions, and a few 
score low on all the conditions (table 9 and annex J). ELECTRA in Cape Verde has the most effective 
tariff structure and scores high on equity, efficiency, and cost recovery. The other outstanding performers 
are Oshakati, Windhoek, STEE, SONEB, and Katsina WB. These utilities impose the most efficient 
pricing mechanism, complemented by cost recovery and equity. STEE in Chad and AWSA in Ethiopia 
are implementing the most equitable tariff structure. ELECTRA, Oshakati, Windhoek, STEE, SONEB, 
and Katsina WB score the highest in efficiency. The cost-recovery conditions are met by four utilities—
ELECTRA, Oshakati, Windhoek, and eThekwani—located in the MICs of Cape Verde, Namibia, and 
South Africa.  
Table 9. Final scorecard for meeting tariff objectives: cost recovery, efficiency, equity 
Criterion 
Maximum 
score  Average (%)  Utilities scoring above average 
Equity  4  51  ELECTRA, AWSA, NWASCO, SEEN, Katsina WB, FCT, Kaduna WB, 
Electrogaz, NWC South Darfur, SDE, STEE, DAEASCO, NWSC, 
Drakenstein, NWSC  
Efficiency  3  45  SONEB, ONEA, ELECTRA, Dire Dawa, GWCL, KIWASCO, WASA, 
CRWB, Oshakati, Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Katsina WB, FCT, 
Electrogaz, Upper Nile, STEE, Johannesburg, Tygerberg  
Cost recovery  2  22  SONEB, ONEA, SODESI, NWASCO, WASA, JIRAMA, BWB, 
Oshakati, Windhoek, SEEN, NWC Upper Nile, NWC Khartoum, SDE, 
DAEASCO, NWSCO, eThekwani, SWSC 
One point is awarded for each of the following criteria: 
[1] Cost recovery: O&M cost recovery 
[2] Cost recovery: Capital cost recovery 
[3] Efficiency: No fixed charge or minimum consumption charge 
[4] Efficiency: Metering ratio is higher than sample average (77%) 
[5] Efficiency: The price of the last block meets the capital cost  
[6] Equity: Small piped consumers (at 4 m
3) pay less than average piped consumers (at 10 m
3) 
[7] Equity: Standpost consumers pay less than small piped consumers (at 4 m
3) 
[8] Equity: Connection cost as share of GNI per capita is lower than sample average (27%) 
[9] Equity: Residential consumers pay less than nonresidential consumers at 100 m
3 of consumption 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
7 Conclusion 
Cost recovery is a mandate for water and sanitation utilities in Africa, and African utilities perform 
well in recouping at least the cost of operations and maintenance (O&M) from their tariff structure. But 
only 36 percent of the utilities surveyed in this paper are meeting their full O&M cost (assuming an COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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arbitrary threshold of $0.4/m
3 for O&M cost recovery), and only 9 percent are meeting O&M costs plus a 
part of their capital costs.  
African utilities operate in a high-cost environment, with an average O&M cost of $0.6/m
3 and higher 
costs for utilities in MICs, such as South Africa and Namibia. These high costs, combined with the 
mandate to cover at least partial O&M costs, make tariffs higher in Africa than in other regions of the 
world.  
The social and economic benefits of providing improved water to the poor are enormous, but 
providing those benefits takes its toll on utilities. The increasing block tariff (IBT) is the most common 
tariff structure in Africa. Most African utilities are able to achieve O&M cost recovery at the highest 
block tariffs, but not at the first-block tariffs, which are designed to provide affordable water to low-
volume consumers, who are often poor.  
Unfortunately, the equity objectives of the IBT structure are not met in many countries. The effective 
price paid by low-volume consumers often is actually higher than that paid by average or high-volume 
consumers. The subsidy to the lowest block under the current IBT structure is not received exclusively by 
the poor, because many consumers who are not poor do not exceed its upper limit. At the same time, the 
minimum consumption charge is often burdensome for the poorest customers.  
Many poor households (in some countries, most poor households) are not even connected to the piped 
water network, so consumption subsidies do not reach them, except indirectly, through public standposts. 
In some countries, the cost of a household connection to the network exceeds GNI per capita. For utilities, 
whose business depends on connecting more customers to the network, the inability of the poor to pay 
connection costs can be a significant barrier to expansion. To create a more inclusive network and enable 
utilities to grow, many countries have begun to subsidize household connections. 
In the rush to provide improved water to meet the targets of the Millennium Development Goals, 
standposts have emerged as an alternative to piped water. Managed by utilities, donors, or private 
operators, standposts are a good choice for many households. Those managed by utilities or that supply 
utility water are expected to use the formal utility tariffs. The average formal standpost tariff established 
by African utilities is about $0.30/m
3. The price is kept low to make improved water available and 
affordable to low-income households. But the price actually charged for water withdrawn from public 
taps and then resold through informal channels can be several orders of magnitude higher (and much 
higher than the price paid by consumers of small volumes of piped water).  
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SONEB Benin               
ONEA Burkina  Faso               
ELECTRA Cape  Verde               
STEE Chad               
REGIDESO DRC               




             




             
GWCL   Ghana               
NWASCO Kenya,  Nairobi               
KIWASCO Kenya,  Kisumu               






















             
JIRAMA Madagascar               
LWB   Malawi, Lilongwe               




             
Walvis Bay  
Namibia, Walvis 
Bay 








             
SEEN Niger               
FCT WB  Nigeria, FCT               
Kaduna WB   Nigeria, Kaduna                
Katsina WB  Nigeria, Katsina               
































             
SDE   Senegal               
DAWASCO  
Tanzania, Dar es 
Salaam 








             




















             
LWSC   Zambia, Lusaka               
NWSC   Zambia, Nkana               
Count of “”   40 40  32  9  4  24  30 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
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Annex B  Categories of water tariff structure in 
African utilities 
Category Utilities  Count 
Minimum 
consumption + IBT 
SODESI, BWB, AdeM Beira, AdeM Pemba, AdeM Nampula, AdeM Quilimane, AdeM 
Maputo   7 
Fixed charge + IBT 
ONEA, JIRAMA, WASA, LWB, Windhoek, Oshakati, DUWASA, MWSA, Drakenstein, 
Tygerrberg, eThekwani, LWSC  12 
IBT 
SONEB, STEE, REGIDESO, SDE, AWSA, ADAMA, Dire Dawa, GWCL, NWASCO, 
Walvis Bay, SEEN, Kaduna WB, Katsina WB, ELECTROGAZ, NWC Khartoum, 
DAWASCO, Johannesburg, NWSC, ELECTRA, SWSC  20 
Fixed charge + linear  NWSC  1 
Fixed charge  CRWB  1 
Linear  FCT, NWC South Darfur, NWC Upper Nile  3 
U-shaped KIWASCO  1 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
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Annex C  Tariffs by level of water consumption 
Utility  4m3  5m3  6m3  8m3  10m3 15m3 20m3 25m3 30m3 40m3 50m3 100m3 
SONEB  0.41 0.41 0.48 0.57 0.63 0.70 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.83 
ONEA  0.90 0.80 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.79 1.12 1.33 1.73 
SODESI  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.20 0.30 0.39 0.45 0.53 0.57 0.71 
ELECTRA  2.67 2.67 2.67 2.93 3.09 3.62 3.88 4.04 4.14 4.27 4.35 4.51 
REGIDESO  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.04 
AWSA  0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.40 
ADAMA  0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.42 
Dire  Dawa  0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.29 
GWCL    0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.69 
NWASCO  0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.40 
KIWASCO  0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.52 
WASA  0.40 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.79 0.88 0.94 1.06 
JIRAMA  0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
ADeM  Beira  0.96 0.77 0.64 0.48 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.61 
Adem  Maputo  0.96 0.77 0.64 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.62 0.64 0.67 
AdeM  Nampula  0.96 0.77 0.64 0.48 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.54 
AdeM  Pemba  0.96 0.77 0.64 0.48 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.53 
AdeM  Quelimane  0.96 0.77 0.64 0.48 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.53 
LWB    0.91 0.79 0.71 0.61 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.57 
BWB    0.12 0.10 0.16 0.24 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.49 
CRWB    0.58 0.47 0.39 0.29 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.08       
Walvis  Bay  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.83 0.90 1.06 1.26 1.38 1.87 
Windhoek  1.45 1.32 1.23 1.26 1.27 1.29 1.30 1.31 1.31 1.32 1.43 1.94 
Oshakati  1.97 1.78 1.65 1.53 1.46 1.36 1.41 1.44 1.46 1.48 1.57 1.76 
SEEN  0.52 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.60 0.76 
FCT  WB    0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Kaduna    0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Katsina  WB    0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 
Electrogaz  0.44 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.92 
NWC  Khartoum  0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.52 
NWC  South  Darfur  0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
NWC  Upper  Nile  0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
SDE    0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.54 0.65 0.78 0.92 1.19 
STEE  0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.43 
DAEASCO    0.39 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 
DUWASA    0.99 0.79 0.66 0.49 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.48 
MWSA    0.51 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 
NWSC  0.88 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.66 
Drakenstein  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.51 0.57 0.85 
Tygerberg  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.35 0.43 0.52 0.64 0.72 0.83 0.94 1.40 
eThekwini  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.08 1.04 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.94 1.14 1.27 1.52 
Johannesburg  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.42 0.56 0.69 0.77 0.87 0.98 1.61 
SWSC  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.41 
LWSC    0.56 0.50 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 
NWSC  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.34 
 
 COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
32 
 









Size of 1st 
block 







BEN SONEB  0.00  0  2  5  5+  0.41  0.85 
BFA ONEA  2.05 27  3  6 30+  0.39  2.13 
CIV SODESI  0.00 0  3 8  300+  0.00  1.20 
CPV ELECTRA  0.00  0  2  6  11+  2.67  4.67 
DRC REGIDESO  0.00  0  4  10 40+  0.05  0.12 
ETH AWSA  0.16  7  5  7  20+  0.19  0.42 
ETH ADAMA  0.00  0  3  5  30+  0.26  0.44 
ETH Dire  Dawa  0.00  0  4  5  50+  0.14  0.34 
GHA GWCL    0.00  0  4  20 20+  0.52  0.73 
KEN NWASCO  0.00  0  2  10 60+  0.18  0.52 
KEN KIWASCO  0.00  0  4  10 60+  0.60  0.60 
LSO WASA  0.00  0  5  5  24+  0.29  1.18 
MDG JIRAMA  0.43  68  4  10  10+  0.03  0.08 
MOZ ADeM  Beira  3.83 100  3  9  30+  0.00  0.66 
MOZ Adem  Maputo 3.83 100  3  9  30+  0.00  0.71 
MOZ AdeM  Nampula  3.83 100  3  9  30+  0.00  0.58 
MOZ AdeM  Pemba 3.83 100  3  9  30+  0.00  0.57 
MOZ AdeM  Quelimane  3.83 100  3  9  30+  0.00  0.57 
MWI LWB    0.30  5  2  10 30+  0.30  0.61 
MWI BWB  2.42 83  1  4  40+  0.00  0.52 
MWI CWB    0.48 20  3 nav nav  0.00  0.00 
NAM Walvis  Bay  2.33  33  0  15 85+  0.71  3.48 
NAM Windhoek  0.00  0  4  6  45+  0.80  2.46 
NAM Oshakati  2.58  18  3  6  40+  1.01  1.94 
NER SEEN  3.85 106  4  10 40+  0.26  0.92 
NGA FCT  WB    1.02 26  3 nav nav  0.39  0.39 
NGA Kaduna  WB    0.00  0  1  30 30+  0.16  0.19 
NGA  Katsina WB   0.00  0  2  30  1000+  0.19  0.28 
RWA Electrogaz  0.00  0  3  5  500+  0.44  1.09 
SDN NWC  Khartoum  0.00  0  6  20 60+  0.37  0.73 
SDN  NWC South Darfur  0.00  0  4  nav  nav  0.64  0.64 
SDN  NWC Upper Nile  0.00  0  1  nav  nav  0.59  0.59 
SEN SDE    0.00  0  1  20 40+  0.37  1.46 
TCD STEE  0.00  0  3  15 15+  0.22  0.47 
TZA DAEASCO    0.00 0  2  5  5+  0.39  0.52 
TZA DUWASA    3.95  100  3 14 25+  0.00  0.51 
TZA MWSA    1.11 32  3 24 75+  0.24  0.28 
UGA NWSC  0.92 12  1 nav nav  0.65  0.65 
ZAF Drakenstein  1.52 60  7  6  1000+  0.00  1.86 
ZAF Tygerberg  2.02 58  6  6 50+  0.00  1.86 











Size of 1st 
block 







ZAF Johannesburg  0.00 0  6  6 40+  0.00  1.40 
ZMB SWSC  0.00  0  4  10 50+  0.30  0.47 
ZMB LWSC    1.24 32  5  6 170+  0.25  0.55 
ZMB NWSC  0.00  0  4  6  50+  0.25  0.37 
MIC average      26 4.00  6.89   0.61 2.29 
LIC average      28 3.03  11.29    0.24 0.61 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
MIC = middle-income countries; LIC = low-income countries. 
 
 COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
34 
 
































BEN  SONEB    n  1 0.85  n  1 0.85  n  1 0.85 
BFA  ONEA    y  1 2.13  y  1 2.13  y  1 2.13 
CIV  SODESI    y  4 0.48    4 0.48  n  1 1.07 
CPV  ELECTRA    n  1  0.78 n  1  0.78 n  1  
DRC2  REGIDESO    n  1  n  3  0.01 n  1  0.00 
ETH1  AWSA    n  1 0.42  n  1 0.42  n  1 0.42 
ETH2  ADAMA    —  — —  —  — —  —  — — 
ETH3  Dire  Dawa    —  — —  —  — —  —  — — 
GHA1b  GWCL    n —  —  — —  2.20 y —  — 
KEN1  NWASCO      —  — —  4  0.18 —  —  — 
KEN2  KIWASCO  y  —  —  — —  5  0.60 —  —  — 
LSO  WASA  y  y  1 0.69  y  1 0.69  y  1 0.69 
MDG  JIRAMA             n  2  0.23 
MOZ1  ADeM  Beira    n  2 15.69  n  2 15.69  n  2 15.69 
MOZ2  Adem  Maputo    n  2 16.75  n  2 16.75  n  2 16.75 
MOZ3  AdeM  Nampula    n  2 13.88  n  2 13.88  n  2 13.88 
MOZ4  AdeM  Pemba    n  2 15.02  n  2 15.02  n  2 15.02 
MOZ5 AdeM  Quilimane    n  2  15.22 n  2  15.22 n  2  15.22 
MWI1  LWB    y  2 0.49  y  2 0.49  y  2 0.45 
MWI2  BWB    —  — —  —  — —  —  — — 
MWI3  CRWB    —  — —  —  — —  —  — — 
NAM1 Walvis  Bay    n  4 1.99  n  4 1.99  n  4 1.99 
NAM2 Windhoek  y  n  1 1.63  n  1 1.63  n  1 1.63 
NA  M3  Oshakati  y  y  3 17.70  y  3 17.70  y  3 17.70 
NER  SEEN    n  3 0.85  n  1 0.87  n  1 0.87 
NGA1b  FCT  WB    n  1 7.84  n  1 0.78  n  2 0.47 
NGA3  Kaduna  WB    n  3 0.55  n  2 0.55  n  2 0.19 
NGA5  Katsina  WB    n  1 1.57  n  1 1.57  n  2 0.20 
RWA  Electrogaz    n  3 0.44  n  3 0.44  n  3 0.44 
SDN1a  NWC  Khartoum    n  1 0.73  n  1 0.73  n  1 0.73 
SDN2  NWC  South  Darfur    n  1 1.41  n  1 1.41  n  1 1.41 
SDN3  NWC  Upper  Nile    n  1 1.35  n  1 1.35  n  1 1.35 
SEN2  SDE    — —  —  — —  1.62 n —  1.62 
TCD  STEE    n  2 0.22  n  2 0.22  n  2 0.22 
TZA1  DAWASCO    n  3 0.57  n  3 0.57  n  3 0.57 

































TZA3  MWSA    n  1 0.47  n  1 0.40  n  1 0.28 
UGA  NWSC    n  1 1.05  n  1 1.05  n  3 0.80 
ZAF1  Drakenstein    —  — —  —  — —  —  — — 
ZAF2  Tygerberg    y  1 0.82  y  1 0.82  y  1 0.82 
ZAF3  eThekwini    y  1 0.88  y  1 0.88  y  1 0.88 
ZAF4  Johannesburg    —  — —  —  — —  —  — — 
ZMB1  SWSC    —  — —  —  — —  —  — — 
ZMB2  LWSC    y      3  0.37      
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
— = data not available. 
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BEN SONEB  n  —  —  —  —   
BFA ONEA  —  —  —  —  —  y 
CPV ELECTRA  —  —  —  —  —  — 
TCD STEE  n  —  —  —  —  — 
DRC REGIDESO  n  —  —  —  —  — 
CIV SODESI  —  y  —  —  —  — 
ETH AWSA  —  —  —  —  —  y 
ETH ADAMA  n  —  —  —  —  — 
ETH Dire  Dawa  n  —  —  —  —  — 
GHA GWCL    n  —  —  —  —  — 
KEN NWASCO  —  —  —  —  —  y 
KEN KIWASCO  —  —  —  —  —  — 
LSO WASA  —  —  —  85  —  — 
MOZ ADeM  Beira  n  —  —  —  —  — 
MOZ Adem  Maputo  n  —  —  —  —  — 
MOZ AdeM  Nampula  n  —  —  —  —  — 
MOZ AdeM  Pemba  n  —  —  —  —  — 
MOZ AdeM  Quelimane  n  —  —  —  —  — 
MDG JIRAMA  —  —  —  —  —  — 
MWI LWB    n  —  —  —  —  — 
MWI BWB    n  —  —  —  —  — 
MWI CRWB    n  —  —  —  —  — 
NAM Walvis  Bay  —  —  —  —  y  y 
NAM Windhoek  —  —  —  —  —  — 
NAM Oshakati  —  y  —  —  y   
NER SEEN  n  —  —  —  —  — 
NGA FCT  WB    —  —  —  —  —  — 
NGA Kaduna  WB    n  —  —  —  —  — 
NGA  Katsina WB   n  —  —  —  —  — 
RWA Electrogaz  n  —  —  —  —  — 
SDN NWC  Khartoum  —  —  —  —  —  — 
SDN  NWC South Darfur  —  —  —  —  —  — 
SDN  NWC Upper Nile  —  —  —  —  —  — 
SEN ONAS    —  —  —  —  —  y 
TZA DAWASCO    —  —  y  80  —  — 
TZA DUWASA    —  y  y  40  —  — 
TZA MWSA    —  y  y  50  —  — 
UGA NWSC  —  y  y  75  —  — 
ZAF Drakenstein  —  —  —  —  —  — 
ZAF Tygerberg  —  —  —  —  —  — 
ZAF eThekwini  —  —  —  —  —  — 















ZMB KWSC    —  —  y  30  —  — 
ZMB LWSC    —  y  y  30  —  — 
ZMB NWSC  —    y  30  —  — 
    Count= 18  Count= 8  Count=8  Average=53%    Count=6 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
— = data not available. 
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Annex G  O&M cost per unit of consumption  
Utility  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Average 
2001–05 
SONEB  — — —  0.66  0.70  0.68 
ONEA  0.49 0.51 0.69 0.74 0.75 0.64 
SODESI  — — — — — — 
ELECTRA  — — — — — — 
REGIDESO  — — — — — — 
AWSA  0.43 0.51 0.52 0.63 0.63 0.54 
ADAMA  2.52 0.73 0.77 1.05 0.70 1.15 
Dire Dawa  —  —  0.16  0.18  0.32  0.22 
GWCL    0.22 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.32 0.24 
NWASCO  — — —  0.21  0.18  0.19 
KIWASCO  — — — — — — 
WASA  — — —  1.05  1.13  1.09 
JIRAMA —  —  0.20  0.25  0.49  0.31 
ADeM  Beira  — — —  0.26  0.16  0.21 
Adem Maputo  —  —  0.50  0.62  0.70  0.61 
AdeM  Nampula  — — — — — —. 
AdeM  Pemba  0.16 0.40 0.62 0.48 0.57 0.45 
AdeM  Quelimane  0.41 0.39 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.41 
LWB   —  —  0.19  0.14  0.23  0.19 
BWB    —  0.31 0.32 0.41 0.51 0.39 
CRWB    —  0.48 0.73 0.58 0.73 0.63 
Walvis  Bay  —  0.22 0.26 0.36 0.35 0.30 
Windhoek  —  0.69 0.32 0.36 0.53 0.47 
Oshakati  —  0.50 0.26 0.38 0.42 0.39 
SEEN  0.82 0.71 1.49 1.46 1.44 1.18 
FCT  WB    — — — — — — 
Kaduna  WB    0.90 0.79 1.07 1.45 2.08 1.26 
Katsina  WB    0.17 0.36 0.47 0.43 0.46 0.38 
Electrogaz  — — — — — — 
NWC  Khartoum  — — — — — — 
NWC  South  Darfur  — — — — — — 
NWC Upper Nile  —  0.11  0.14  0.29  0.06  0.15 
SDE    —  0.19 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.23 
STEE  —  — 0.18  0.20 — 0.19 
DAEASCO    —  0.18 0.19 0.34 0.51 0.31 
DUWASA    — — — — — — 
MWSA    0.65 0.64 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.76 
NWSC  0.46 0.44 0.83 0.98 1.21 0.78 
Drakenstein —  —  0.45  0.60  0.70  0.58 
Tygerberg —  —  1.09  1.32  1.56  1.32 
eThekwini  0.91 0.94 1.24 1.35 1.50 1.19 
Johannesburg  — — — —  0.28  0.28 COST RECOVERY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
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Utility  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Average 
2001–05 
SWSC  — — — —  0.49  0.49 
LWSC    — — — —  0.73  0.73 
NWSC  — — — — — — 
Average  0.61 0.44 0.49 0.55 0.61   
MIC  0.78 0.72 0.95 1.11 1.31   
LIC  0.55 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.46   
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
MIC = middle-income countries; LIC = low-income countries. 
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SONEB  0.41 y  n  n 0.63 y  n  n 0.79 y  y  n 
ONEA  0.90 y  y  n 0.76 y  y  n 1.12 y  y  y 
SODESI  0.04 n  n  n  0.06 n  n  n  0.53 y  n  n 
ELECTRA  2.67 y —  y  3.09 y —  y  4.27 y —  y 
REGIDESO  0.05 n  N  n  0.05 n  N  n  0.07 n  n  n 
AWSA  0.19 n  N  n  0.24 n  N  n  0.36 n  y  n 
ADAMA  0.26 n  N  n  0.29 n  N  n  0.39 n  y  n 
Dire  Dawa  0.14 n  N  n  0.17 n  N  n  0.24 n  y  n 
GWCL  0.52 y —  n 0.52 y —  n 0.63 y —  n 
NWASCO  0.18 n  n  n  0.18 n  n  n  0.29 n  n  n 
KIWASCO  0.60 y  y  n 0.60 y  y  n 0.45 y  n  n 
WASA  0.40  n y  n 0.43 y y  n 0.88  y y  y 
JIRAMA  0.11 n  n  n  0.06 n  n  n  0.08 n  n  n 
ADeM  Beira  0.96 y n  n 0.38  n n  n 0.53  y Y  n 
Adem  Maputo  0.96 y n  n 0.38  n n  n 0.62  y n  n 
AdeM  Nampula 0.96 y y  n 0.38  n y  n 0.48  y y  n 
AdeM  Pemba  0.96 y n  n 0.38  n n  n 0.46  y n  n 
AdeM  Quelimane  0.96 y n  n 0.38  n n  n 0.46  y y  n 
LWB  0.91 y  n  n 0.54 y  n  n 0.51 y  n  n 
BWB  0.12 n  n  n  0.29 n  n  n  0.45 y  y  n 
CRWB  0.58 y y  n 0.23  n y  n 0.00  n n  n 
Walvis  Bay  0.71 y —  n 0.71 y —  n 1.26 y —  y 
Windhoek  1.45 y  n  y  1.27 y  n  y  1.32 y  n  y 
Oshakati  1.97 y  y  y  1.46 y  y  y  1.48 y  y  y 
SEEN  0.52 y n  n 0.36  n n  n 0.52  y y  n 
FCT  WB  0.39 n —  n  0.39 n —  n  0.39 n —  n 
Kaduna  WB  0.16 n —  n  0.16 n —  n  0.17 n —  n 
Katsina  WB  0.19 n  y  n  0.19 n  y  n  0.20 n  y  n 
Electrogaz  0.44 y  n  n 0.50 y  n  n 0.63 y  y  n 
NWC  Khartoum  0.37 n  y  n  0.37 n  y  n  0.37 n  y  n 
NWC South Darfur  0.64  y  y  n  0.64  y  y  n  0.64  y  y  n 
NWC Upper Nile  0.59  y  n  n  0.59  y  n  n  0.59  y  n  n 
SDE  0.37 n  n  n  0.37 n  n  n  0.78 y  n  n 
STEE  0.22 n —  n  0.22 n —  n  0.38 n —  n 
DAEASCO  0.39  n — n 0.45 y — n 0.50  y — n 
DUWASA  0.99 y n  n 0.40  n n  n 0.44  y y  n 
MWSA  0.51 y y  n 0.35  n y  n 0.27  n y  n 
NWSC  0.88 y  y  n 0.74 y  y  n 0.67 y  y  n 














































Tygerberg  0.00 n  n  n  0.35 n  n  n  0.83 y  n  y 
eThekwini  0.00  n n  y 1.04  y n  y 1.14  y n  y 
Johannesburg  0.00 n  n  n  0.24 n  n  n  0.87 y  n  y 
SWSC  0.30 n  n  n  0.30 n  n  n  0.34 n  y  n 
LWSC  0.56 y y  n 0.39  n y  n 0.34  n y  n 
NWSC  0.25 n  y  n  0.26 n  y  n  0.29 n  y  n 
Cost  Recovery  (%)  23  13  4   16  13  4   29  22  9 
Average  0.55       0.49       0.63      
MIC  0.72       0.89       1.31      
LIC  0.50       0.38       0.44      
 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
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Ratio of official 
piped water price 
at 4m
3 to official 
standpost price 
SONEB  0.41 1.91 0.41 4.66 0.99 
ONEA  0.51 0.48 0.90 0.94 1.76 
SODESI  0.45 0.93 0.04 2.06 0.09 
ELECTRA  — 9.44  2.67 —  — 
REGIDESO 0.05  1.02  0.05  20.40  0.93 
AWSA  0.19 0.87 0.19 4.55 1.02 
ADAMA —  —  0.26  —  — 
Dire Dawa  —  —  0.14  —  — 
GWCL    3.64 5.51 0.52 1.52 0.14 
NWASCO n.a  1.73  0.18  —  — 
KIWASCO Nav  —  0.60  —  — 
WASA n.a  2.58  0.40  —  — 
JIRAMA  0.14 1.24 0.11 8.60 0.75 
ADeM  Beira    0.96    
Adem  Maputo 0.31 0.98 0.96 3.17 3.09 
AdeM Nampula  —  —  0.96  —  — 
AdeM Pemba  —  —  0.96  —  — 
AdeM Quelimane  —  —  0.96  —  — 
LWB   —  —  0.91  —  — 
BWB    0.29 1.16 0.12 4.00 0.41 
CRWB   —  —  0.58  —  — 
Walvis Bay  —  —  0.71  —  — 
Windhoek  1.41 n.a 1.45 n.a 1.02 
Oshakati —  —  1.97  —  — 
SEEN  0.24 0.48 0.52 1.97 2.13 
FCT WB   —  —  0.39  —  — 
Kaduna  WB    n.a n.a  0.16  n.a n.a 
Katsina WB   —  —  0.19  —  — 
Electrogaz  0.44 1.79 0.44 4.07 1.00 
NWC  Khartoum  0.92 1.15 0.37 1.25 0.40 
NWC South Darfur  —  —  0.64  —  — 
NWC Upper Nile  —  —  0.59  —  — 
SDE    0.54 1.53 0.37 2.83 0.69 
STEE  n.a n.a  0.22  n.a n.a 
DAEASCO    0.58 0.87 0.39 1.51 0.67 
DUWASA   —  —  0.99  —  — 
MWSA   —  —  0.51  —  — 


















Ratio of official 
piped water price 
at 4m
3 to official 
standpost price 
Drakenstein —  —  0.00  —  — 
Tygerberg —  —  0.00  —  — 
eThekwini —  —  0.00  —  — 
Johannesburg —  — 0.00 —  — 
SWSC —  —  0.30  —  — 
LWSC    0.19 1.67 0.56 9.03 3.02 
NWSC —  —  0.25  —  — 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
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Annex J  Scorecard on cost recovery, efficiency, and 
equity in tariff structure 
Utility 
Cost 
recovery Efficiency  Equity  Total  score 





















































SONEB  1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 3 1  6 
ONEA  1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 1  5 
SODESI  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1  —  2 0 0  2 
ELECTRA  1 1 1 1 1 1 1  —  1 3 3 2  8 
REGIDESO  0 0 1 0 0 1 0  —  0 1 1 0  2 
AWSA  0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 1 0  5 
Dire  Dawa  0 0  1  1  0  1 — 0 — 1  2  0  3 
ADAMA  0 0  1  0  0  1 — 1 — 2  1  0  3 
GWCL    1 0 1 1 0 1 0  —  1 2 2 1  5 
NWASCO  0 0 1 0 0 1 1    1 3 1 0  4 
KIWASCO  1 0 1 0 1 1    1 0 2 2 1  5 
WASA  1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 1  5 
JIRAMA  0  0  0  0 0  0  0    0  0  0  0 
AdeM  Pemba  0 0 0 1 0 0  —  0 1 1 1 0  2 
AdeM  Quelimane  0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 0  3 
ADeM  Beira  0 0 0 0 0 0  —  0 1 1 0 0  1 
Adem  Maputo  0 0 0 0 0 0  —  0 1 1 0 0  1 
AdeM  Nampula  0 0 0 0 0 0  —  0 1 1 0 0  1 
BWB    0  0  0  1  0  1 — — —  1  1  0  2 
CRWB    0 0  0  1  1  0 0 —  — 0  2  0  2 
LWB    1 0 0 1 0 0  —  —  0 0 1 1  2 
Oshakati  1 1 1 1 1 0  —  —  1 1 3 2  6 
Windhoek  1 1 1 1 1 0 1  —  0 1 3 2  6 
Walvis  Bay  1 0 0 1 1 1  —  1    2 2 1  5 
SEEN  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 0 0  3 
Katsina WB   0  0  1  1  1  1  —  1  1  3  3  0  6 
FCT  WB    0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 2 0  5 
Kaduna  WB    0 0 1 0 0 1  —  1 1 3 1 0  4 
Electrogaz  1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 2 1  6 
NWC  Upper  Nile  1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 2 1  5 
NWC  Khartoum  0 0 1 0 0 1  —  0 1 2 1 0  3 
NWC South Darfur  1  0  1  0  0  1  —  1  1  3  1  1  5 
SDE    0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 1 0  4 
STEE  0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 0  7 





recovery Efficiency  Equity  Total  score 





















































DUWASA    0 0 0 0 0 0  —  1 1 2 0 0  2 
MWSA    0 0 0 0 0 0  —  1    1 0 0  1 
NWSC  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 1  5 
eThekwini  1 1 0 0 1 1  —  1 0 2 1 2  5 
Johannesburg  0 0 1 1 1 1  —  1 0 2 3 0  5 
Tygerberg  0 0 0 1 1 1  —  1 0 2 2 0  4 
Drakenstein  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1  —  3 1 0  4 
SWSC  0 0  1  0  0  1 — 1 — 2  1  0  3 
NWSC  0 0 1 0 0 1 1  —  1 3 1 0  4 
LWSC    0 0 0 0 0 0  —  1 1 2 0 0  2 
Source: AICD WSS Survey Database, 2007. 
Note: The utility scores 1 against a specific criterion according to: 
[1] Cost Recovery: O&M cost recovery 
[2] Cost Recovery: Capital cost recovery 
[3] Efficiency: No fixed charge or minimum consumption charge 
[4] Efficiency: Metering ratio is higher than sample average (77%) 
[5] Efficiency: The price of the last block meets the capital cost  
[6] Small piped consumers (at 4 m
3) pay less than average piped consumers (at 10 m
3) 
[7] Standpost consumers pay less than small piped consumers (at 4 m
3) 
[8] Connection cost as share of GNI per capita is lower than sample average (27%) 
[9] Residential consumers pay less than nonresidential consumers at 100 m
3 of consumption   
— = data not available. 






This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to expand the 
world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. 
AICD will provide a baseline against which future 
improvements in infrastructure services can be measured, 
making it possible to monitor the results achieved from 
donor support. It should also provide a better empirical 
foundation for prioritizing investments and designing 
policy reforms in Africa’s infrastructure sectors.  
AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect 
detailed economic and technical data on African 
infrastructure. The project has produced a series of reports 
(such as this one) on public expenditure, spending needs, 
and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure 
sectors—energy, information and communication 
technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. 
Africa’s Infrastructure—A Time for Transformation, 
published by the World Bank in November 2009, 
synthesizes the most significant findings of those reports.  
AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium 
for Africa after the 2005 G-8 summit at Gleneagles, which 
recognized the importance of scaling up donor finance for 
infrastructure in support of Africa’s development.  
The first phase of AICD focused on 24 countries that 
together account for 85 percent of the gross domestic 
product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-
Saharan Africa. The countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of 
the project, coverage is expanding to include as many other 
African countries as possible.  
Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is 
on the 48 countries south of the Sahara that face the most 
severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the 
study also cover North African countries so as to provide a 










The World Bank is implementing AICD with the guidance 
of a steering committee that represents the African Union, 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
Africa’s regional economic communities, the African 
Development Bank, the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa, and major infrastructure donors.  
Financing for AICD is provided by a multidonor trust fund 
to which the main contributors are the U.K.’s Department 
for International Development, the Public Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Agence Française de 
Développement, the European Commission, and Germany’s 
KfW Entwicklungsbank. The Sub-Saharan Africa Transport 
Policy Program and the Water and Sanitation Program 
provided technical support on data collection and analysis 
pertaining to their respective sectors. A group of 
distinguished peer reviewers from policy-making and 
academic circles in Africa and beyond reviewed all of the 
major outputs of the study to ensure the technical quality of 
the work. 
The data underlying AICD’s reports, as well as the reports 
themselves, are available to the public through an 
interactive Web site, www.infrastructureafrica.org, that 
allows users to download customized data reports and 
perform various simulations. Inquiries concerning the 
availability of data sets should be directed to the editors at 




   
 
 